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33 ESPRIT 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament concerning a 
review to assess the performance and results of the Programme 
1.  In  its  Decision  84/130/EEC of 28th February 1984  the  Council  adopted  the  first 
phase  of  the  European  Strategic  Programme  for  Research· and  Development  in 
Information  Technologies  (ESPRIT).  Article 8  of  the  Decision  requires  the 
Commission to establish a report on the performance and results of the Programme at 
the end of its five-year period. 
2.  The Commission  therefore  set  up  an  independent  high  level  body,  known  as  the 
ESPRIT  Review  Board,  to  undertake  the  assessment.  The  Board,  under  the 
chairmanship of Dr A. E. Pannenborg, conducted its review from October 1988  until 
May 1989. 
3.  The Review was carried out by  means of a series of face-to-face interviews,  mailed 
questionnaires and desk research.  A  total of 210 industrial, academic and research 
participant  organisations  provided  input  at  face-to-face  meetings.  Questionnaire 
responses were obtained from 949 participants.  The views expressed and opinions of 
the organisations and individuals interviewed were collected, collated and used as the 
basis  of the  conclusions  derived  by  the  Review  Board  and  the  recommendations 
submitted to the Commission. 
4.  The objectives of the Review were: 
- to assess the extent of which ESPRIT I was achieving its objectives; 
- to determine the effects of the Programme; 
- to  assess  the need  for  any  changes  affecting  ESPRIT or future  IT-related 
Community programmes. - 2 -
5.  The Report (Executive Version), drawn up by  the Board, is  annexed.  The report was 
submitted  to  the  Commission  on  6th June 1989,  and  the  ESPRIT  Management 
Committee for consultation at its meeting in Brussels of 16th June 1989. 
6.  The Commission  regards this  Review as an essential operation and intends to  draw 
fully  on  its  results for  the further management of its  programmes.  It  is  the first  full 
review  of a  Community  R&D Programme  in  the  industrial  sphere at  its  five-year 
mark.  The Board, supported by its Technical Secretariat, deserves recognition for the 
conduct and successful completion of an ambitious and complex operation. 
7.  As the Board has recognized, ESPRIT was started against a background of decline in 
Europe's IT industry  and  a  worsening  balance of trade  in  this  field.  Created  to 
contribute to  a  healthy indigenous IT industry,  ESPRIT is  of a  precompetitive and 
long-term nature.  Hence, mid-way through the full  ten-year term of the Programme, 
it  has yet  to  have its  full  impact.  Nevertheless,  there has  been a  broadly positive 
development in  the IT industry since the setting-up of ESPRIT, a development which 
the Programme is  universally felt  to have fostered.  The Board found that in  the vast 
majority of projects, trans-European cooperation has been a success and that Europe's 
technological  base  has  improved  as a  result  of ESPRIT.  Moreover, ESPRIT has 
helped  European companies to  move from  followers  to  leaders in  the evolution  of 
standards across a range of different technologies.  However, it would be hazardous to 
underestimate the problems which remain, including dependencies on overseas supply 
in key technology areas.  It is against this background that the ESPRIT Programri1e is 
being  implemented,  and  on  the  basis  of  which  the  Board  has  made  its 
recommendations. 
8.  The Commission has considered the principal recommendations which the Board has 
set out on pp. 33-34 of its Report.  These recommendations have been accepted by the 
Commission.  In cases where it  has been recommended that Programme management 
take  action,  recommendations  will,  where  feasible,  be  implemented  as  rapidly  as 
possible  during  the  course  of the  on-going  second  phase  of ESPRIT.  The  first 
occasion will be the impending public Call for Proposals  .. 
9.  The  Commission  accepts  that  Information  Technology  remains  of  strategic 
importance to  the European economy,  and  is  a  key  to  competitiveness of a  large 
proportion of European industry as well as the means to support improvements in  the 
quality of life  of the European citizen.  The Commission  intends that  the  Board's - 3 -
observations  on  the  ever  more  pervasive  nature  of  IT,  and  in  particular  the 
recommendation  that  greater emphasis  should  be  placed  on  Microelectronics  and 
Computer Integrated Manufacturing, will  be fully  reflected in  the proposal for a new 
Framework Programme which the Commission is currently preparing. 
I  0.  The  Commission  will  endeavour  to  ensure  that  users  of Information  Technology 
products and services, and, in  particular, software houses, are involved more directly 
in  the formulation of the annual Workprogramme.  Moreover, above and beyond the 
specific task of Workprogramme formulation,  the Commission wishes to extend and 
deepen  the  involvement  of users  into  all  phases  of Programme  preparation  and 
execution.  In  particular, the Commission intends to strengthen the representation of 
users  in  the  ESPRIT  Advisory  Board,  the  independent  advisory  body  of senior 
European industrialists and scientists which  the Commission consults on key  issues 
relating to the Programme. 
11.  The Board considers the area of value  added services  in  Computer Networking  to 
have great importance and has recommended a global review of the strategy.  On the 
basis  of the  Board's  findings,  the  Commission  will  initiate  a  comprehensive  and 
independent review of the requirements for information exchange services to support 
collaborative  R&D and  the  role of the Commission  in  bringing these about.  This 
review, scheduled to report within three months, will distinguish between the services 
which are required by users and possible R&D activities in  the field.  The review will 
provide a requirements analysis defining the functional specification and modalities of 
implementation  of  required  services  on  a  cost-effective  basis.  The  review  will 
encompass the options for introducing new services, extending and enhancing existing 
services or terminating and transferring services to the public domain. 
12.  The  Commission  will  be  launching  a  further  public  CaU  for  Proposals  under 
ESPRIT II in September 1989.  With this caU  in view, the Commission has noted that 
the Board has pin-pointed certain aspects of the procedure which may be amenable to 
further improvement, and, in particular, the shortening of the time-span between calls 
for proposals and contract award.  Concerning the shortening of this time-span,  the 
Commission feels  that this  is  a complex problem, since most of the elapsed time  is 
taken up by  the consortia members themselves setting up their proper arrangements 
between them to arrive at weU conceived and organized projects.  This is essential to 
ensure later on  the smooth  management  of the ensuing cross-company and cross-
border projects,  but does require up  front  preparatory effort.  Trying to  save  time - 4 -
there  would  negatively  effect  project  management  later  on.  However,  the 
Commission intends to firmly  enforce the recommendation of the Board to limit the 
number  of  partners  in  the  consortia  (except  for  projects  which  are  mainly 
standardization-oriented),  and  that  in  itself  will  ease  and  streamline  this  project 
preparatory phase, as well as project execution later. 
13.  Concerning  the  Board's  analysis  of further  aspects  of project  administration,  the 
Commission intends to  set  up  a  small  task  force  composed of experienced  project 
managers,  including  ESPRIT project  partners,  which  will  work  in  a  concentrated 
manner  and  identify  concrete  operational  measures  to  implement  the  Board's 
recommendations. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
ESPRIT,  the  European  Strategic  Programme  for  Research  anJ 
development  in  Information  Technologies  was  conceived  as  a  ten  year 
prngr<imme.  It was formally launched on J.tnuary 1st,  1984, as a  five  year 
programme  with  total  funding  of  1.5  billion  ECUs,  of  which  the 
Community's contribution was 50%.  Later the programme was  extenLkJ 
for a  further five  years.  This second phase,  ESPRIT II,  amounting to  3.~ 
billion ECUs, is  funded on the same basis: 50% from the Community a!ld 
50% from p:uticipating industrial, academic and research bodies. 
The overall strategic goal of ESPRIT was to provide European information 
technology (IT) industry with the technology base which it needs to become 
and stay competitiw: with the US and Japan in the 1990s.  In addition to this 
primary objective, two others were identified, namely: 
- Promotion of Europe's industrial co-operation in IT. 
- Contribution to the development of internationally accepted standards. 
Prior to the start of ESPRIT I there had been a one year pilot phase, during 
which  a  series  of projects  were  started  and  much  af the  organisational 
structu:-e established.  A  review was carried out in  19R5  to obtain feedback 
and comment  from  a  large sample of participant organisations.  This sn 
called Mid Term Review concluded that ESPRIT was well established and 
received,  seemed  to  be  highly  successful  in  promoting  trans-Eurorean 
cooperation and  was  not  in  conflict  with  national programmes.  Certain 
changes were  suggested  to  the  modalities of the programme.  The  Mid 
Term Review recommended that for the future the emphasis should remain 
on precompetitive R&D, the research areas should be restructured and that 
focussed demonstration projects should be added to the programme.  The 
essence of these suggestions were adopted within ESPRIT II. 
This Review of ESPRIT I lasted from October 1988 until May 1989, anJ was 
undertaken hy an independent Review Board.  The objectives of the review 
wcr·:: 
- To ::s;,cs~ the extent to which ESPRIT I was achieving its objectives. 
- To determine the effects of the programme. 
- To assess the need for any changes affect  ins ESPRIT or future IT-rel:t tt:d 
coJTJmunity programmes. 
The review was carried out by means of: 
- race-to-face  interviews  with  210  industrial,  academic  and  resear..:h 
participant organisations plus a  further ~  intetviews with  Commissiou 
officials,  with  evaluators  and  reviewers  as  well  as  with  national 
administrations;  T· 
- Analysis of 949 questionnaires completed ~f participants. 
,f~.:· 
- Inputs from external consultants. ERB Members 
Technical 
secretariat 
- Desk research of puhlished information sources. 
The  reader  may  wish  to  rder  to  the  [~tenJeJ  Report  of the  ESPRIT 
Review  Board (ERB) which  contains the  findings  and analysis  in  full  with 
comprehensive supporting annexes. 
The memhers of the ESPRIT Review Board were: 
Dr. A.E. Pannenborg 
(Chairman of Review Board) 
Professor H_ Durand 
(Executive Vice-Chairman) 
Professor U. Colombo 
Dr. 1. R.Forrest 
Professor P.L. 01gaard 
Professor J. Peracaula 
Professor I. Ruge 
Retired Vice-Chairman of the Board 
of N.Y.  Philips 
Professor at Paris University and 
former Assistant Secretary General 
of NATO (Scientific Affairs and 
Environment). 
Chairman of the Italian National 
Agency for Atomic and Alternative 
Energy Sources (ENEA) and former 
chairman of the EC Committee on 
Science and Technology (CODEST). 
Director of Engineering, 
Independent Broadcasting 
Authority, United Kingdom. 
Professor at the Institute of 
Electrophysics, Technical University 
of Denmark. 
Professor of Electronic Engineering. 
Technical University of Catalonia, 
and Director of the Barcelona High 
Technical School for Industrial  ~ 
Engineering. 
Director of the Fraunhofer Institute 
for Solid State Technology, Munich 
At the Review Board meeting on May 24th 1989 they collectively approved 
the publication of this report. 
The members of the ERB were assisted by  a full-time technical secretariat, 
consisting  mainly  of  experienced  indeperdent  consultants,  and  four 
secretaries.  The  technical  secretariat  members  and  their  countries  of 
residence were: 
Mr.  T.F.  Ch:tpman  (Belgium),  Mr.  f'.  Danielsen  (Denmark),  Mrs.  L. 
Henriques (Portugal), Mr. K.  Kataras (Greece), Mr.  R.D. Killick (UK) and 
Mr. P.  Murtagh (Ireland). 
2 The IT scene in 
Europe 
ESPRIT l 
KEY OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
ESPRIT was started against a hackground of decline in Europe's IT industry 
and  a  worsening  balance  of  tradt!  in  this  field.  There was  widespread 
agreement that a  healthy  indigenous IT industry and extensive use of IT 
would be of great significance in assuring future prosperity and employmc:nt 
prospects within  the  Community.  Since  then  there  has  been a  growing 
understanding that IT plays a key role in assuring quality of life as well.  For 
the future  Europe needs clean wealth  producing  industries.  Informatiun 
Technology is  one such, but it  also  provides pivotal ingredients within  the 
service sectors, together with socially important areas such as education and 
health  care,  besides  being  an  enabling  technology  for  all  almost  every 
economic activity. 
Over the past five  years the European IT industry has had mixed fortunes. 
In  microelectronics, the advt!rse balance of trade has continued whilst the 
technological base has improved.  In  computer systems,  market share has 
been well maintained within Europe, but not elsewhere.  The position with 
respect to computer peripherals remains very weak.  In spftware, European 
companies have performed well whilst in industrial automation, Europe has 
held its own. 
Considerable industrial restructuring has occurred in  recent years and will 
continue as  the European "national champions"  regroup to address world 
markets.  -
On the global scale Europe's IT industry is  still weak but better positioned 
and  more  optimistic  about  its  future  than  five  years  ago.  Its  strategic 
importance is  undiminished.  By  1993  it will represent the largest economic 
sector  in  Europe  and  almost  two  thirds  of other  industrial  and  service 
sectors \viil depend upon it for their efficiency and competitiveness. 
The resources allocated to ESPRIT I are but a  small fraction  of the total 
R&D in information technology within community countries.  Furthermore, 
the work was precompetitive and mostly of a long term nature.  Therefore, 
it  is  premature to identify a direct causal relationship at this stage between 
ESPRIT and  Europe's competitive  performance vis-a-vis  its  major  rivals. 
the USA and Japan. 
The Review Board's overall perception of ESPRIT I, after a  large numhl..'r 
of interviews and considerahle research, is positive. 
The  ERB  found  that  in  the  vast  majority  of  projects  trans-European 
cooperation has been a  success and resulted in  significant benefits for the 
participants.  There have been direct benefits of being able to cover a wiJer 
range of research  topics  more quickly  by  sharing results with  the project 
partners.  And  there  have  been  indirect  benefits  such  as  an  improved 
awareness within  Europe of the need  to  look outside national boundaries 
and the use of the diverse opportunities present within Europe, with  respe~..'t 
to hoth research cooperation and future markets  . 
.  1 Workplan 
pragmatically 
determined 
Technology has 
improved 
Good progress in 
standards 
Communications 
infrastructure 
Programme 
managed well and •.• 
Europe's  technolngicd  !);tsc  h;ts  improved  as  ;1  result  of  ESPRIT,  i:1 
techniques and facilities  and, most irnport:ttltly, in  human rcsour('es.  Good 
work has been done on in[nn;ttional standards.  Links between industry and 
universities  have  been  strengthened  and  transnation:llly,  have oiten  been 
created for the first time.  Managerial awareness of the strategic importance 
of  IT  has  been  heightened  and  there  is  an  increased  confidence  and 
optimism about the future. 
All  these  are  positive  outcomes  of  ESPRIT.  This  is  not  to  sav  tha: 
everything about ESPRIT and the way it  is  evolving is  perfect but rat.her to 
set  this report which necessarily dwells more extensively on criticisms than 
compliments into a balanced context. 
Industry  selected  the  research  areas  and  defined  the  workplan  for 
ESPRIT I.  Five  years  ago  the  largest  European companies viewed  one 
another much more as competitors than colla bora tors.  TI1ere was no united 
view  of the  strategic  priorities  for  the  industry  nor,  indeed,  was  there 
sufficient confidence in  the efficacy of ESPRIT for  them  to commit their 
core business developments to the programme.  Despite these problems at 
the  inception  of the  programme  the  rather  pragmatic  work  plan  which 
resulted did address a number of technological issues of great significance in 
the  three  areas  of  microelectror.ics,  software  technology  and  advanced 
information  processing,  and  their  application  to  office  systems  and 
computer integrated manufacturing. 
Turning now  to  the  results of ESPRIT, we  the  find  that  the  European 
technology base has  improved.  This improvement  is  in  all  the  research 
areas addressed.  In some topics, European technology has moved ahead of 
its competitors; in others, the improvement has been in  much needed "c:\tch 
up"  technology  (for example,  in  silicon  chips).  Rather  too  much  of the 
technological advance  has been  in  niche  areas with  limited  potential  for 
future market exploitation.  Given the manner in  which the workplan was 
constructed this is,  perhaps, not surprising. 
A  number  of ESPRIT  projects  (15%)  aimed  to  work  on  international 
standards.  The thinking behind this was that the IT marketplace is  moving 
more and more to  the adoption of standards.  Only companies with  the 
largest market  shares can  afford  to promote their proprietary standards. 
The  rest  must  use  common  international  standards,  where  competitive 
advantage  should  lie  with  those  who  lead  in  standards  development. 
ESPRIT has helped European companies to move from followers to leaders 
in the evolution of standards across a range of different technologies. 
All the services which it  was hoped to provide to ESPRIT I participants did 
not meet the expectations in  the way origin:tlly foreseen.  ·The goals set were 
overambitious.  For  the  future.  Value  Added  Services  for  coUaborativc 
R&D remain desirable.  A reappraisal is needed of precisely how to obtain 
these and what the Commission's role in their provision should be. 
The ERB  found  that  the management of ESPRIT has,  in  general, been 
satisfactory and smooth and the procedures and modalities sensible. 
4 Project Reviews 
ciTectivc but •.. 
... se"eral areas 
n(:Cd  improving 
ESPRJT II 
Hc~·ond ESPRIT 
Every  project  is  reviewed  by  independent  experts  periodically,  typically 
every  six  months.  This  is  a  feature  which  was  pioneered  by  ESPRIT 
amongst publicly  funded  R&D programmes and seems to work very  wdl. 
The outsiders view can help hoth the project and the Commission, especially 
when work has to be redirected. 
11H! programme management could be improved in  a  number of respects  . 
The handling of contract negotiation  and  the speed of payments  were  a 
source of justified criticism.  The Commission was perceived not  to  have 
ensured  adequate  access  to  the  results  between  ESPRIT projects.  The 
number of partners in a project should not - except for standards projects -
rise ahove six. 
The ERB concentrated on reviewing ESPRIT I and, in  no sense, should this 
report he considered a  review of ESPRIT ll.  Nevertheless, various lessons 
learned and opinions formed during the review have relevance to ESPRIT 
II.  In  general,  the  ERB  supports  the  changes  of emphasis  which  are 
apparent in  the evolution of ESPRIT.  In p:1rticular, a stronger focus on the 
potential for  economic exploitation  and greater involvement of users are 
both wdcome. 
Within  ESPRIT II the  programme  has  become  targeted  towards  major 
strategic  themes.  Nevertheless,  the  European  approach  to  planning 
necessarily runs the risk of producing more widely based programmes th::111 
these to be found in either the USA or Japan. 
The evaluation of proposals has become more systematic and the project 
database much more reliable.  The ERB is concerned about the problems of 
managing projects with  a  large number of participants.  While welcoming 
the Basic Research Action in ESPRIT II the ERB believes that the excellent 
links  which  have  built  up between  industry and academia  transnation:dlv 
should be maintained. 
The IT industry together with industries and services which derive muL·h  of 
their competitive advantage from the application of information technology 
arc of great  importance  to  the  Community's  future.  The  ERB  believes 
continued Community action beyond ESPRIT will be needed in the IT fidd 
and certain principles are important in its eventual formulation. 
Cooperative research and development is a formula which is now beginning 
to work effectively and should be retained.  Basic research must continue 
and even  he increased.  There needs to  he a  greater degree of concerted 
actit1n by project teams and sharper strategic focus on market opportunities. 
The way  in  which  ESPRIT II  has evolved  towards a  stronger application 
orientation  involving  users  to  help  pull  technology  through  into  the 
marketplace  is  a  change  in  the  right  direction  but  further  evolut inn  is 
needed.  As  well  as  a  broadly hased  technology push  programme,  room 
should also he made for a few amhitious. structured, goal-oriented projects. 
Finally,  pressure must be sustained to reduce timescales of all  aspects of 
research and development within IT in order to react to the extremely rapid 
changt:s which are occuring in the marketplace. 
5 Signilicance of the 
IT sector 
Trade deficit in IT 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY IN EUROPE 
IT industrial output in  Europe represents around 4.4% of European gross 
domestic product.  Based on  quite modest estimates of market growth,  IT 
will  represent  6.7%  of GOP by  1993  which  will  be more  than  any  othc:r 
industrial  sector.  Moreover,  almost  two  thirds  of other  industrial  and 
service sectors depend for their efficiency and competitiveness on IT. 
The area addressed by ESPRIT was and will  remain of great importance: for 
the future prosperity of Europe. 
At  the  start  of ESPRIT  I,  the  Community  was  becoming  rapidly  more 
dependant on IT imports.  In  1975  it  still had a trade surplus in  IT products. 
By  1980 the trade deficit had reached $5 billion.  It has worsened since tht.:n 
and  is  predicted to continue to deteriorate for  some time in  all  areas of 
electronics particularly IT. 
Europe's trade deficit in electronics was $21.9 billion in  1987 
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It is  unwise to rely on the absolute values of these figures since there are 
serious  problems  with  their  collection  and  defmition.  Indeed,  some 
governments  within  the  community  do  not  publish  their  national  trade 
balances in IT at aU. 
To clarify  the situation  it  is  necessary to consider the position sector hy 
sector. 
ESPRIT  focussed  on  the  information  processing  and  microelectronics 
sectors.  Public telecommunications was excluded from  ESPRIT and now 
has a prn~rammt~. RAC'F., devoted to th:at area. 
6 ( ·~~n,putt:r Systems 
I 
I 
ESPRIT also addressed the  use of  IT in  the office  ailJ the  rnanuf:iL·ttFirH: 
environment.  From  a  market  appraisal  standpoint,  the  office  systL'm: 
supported hy ESPRIT are included within compUTer systems. 
As  well as Cl)mputer hardware, computer systems also includes  periphcr~t!s. 
software and service. 
In computer systems, Europe (Community and EFTA countries) repre:-t.·nts 
atx)Ut one third of a world market worth ap;xoximately $250 billion. 
This proportion is  broadly in  line with what one would  expect,  bearing in 
mind Europe's gross national product as a proportion of the world total.  It 
indicates that Europe is an advanced and heavy user of computer systems. 
Unfortunately,  only  some  13%  of the  W()rld  total  came  from  European 
suppliers in  1987. 
Europe within the world markets for information systems 
DEMAND  SUPPLY  -l 
I 
I 
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$2~0  l-
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Source:  Datamation/EIC 
Since  1984,  European computer companies have defended their position:> 
well.  Market  share  has  been  sustained  by  giving  good  service  to  the 
established customer  hase and  hy  some rontinuing  national support  ln 
some i:1stances, European vendors have kept their turnover up by adopting 
the  rok of system integrator or of product  distributor which  results  in  a 
reduction in value added and in  export potential. 
7 The ch:1rt  '>hows the market  :-.hare~; pf tt1e top t•:n :-.uppliers to the European 
market and the acnH11panying tahk  illustratl~~ tht.:  growth in  their revenues 
over the period I  'JX4-lH. 
Performance of European IT companies 1984-1'\7 
Suppliers  t.o  t.he  European  "'arket.  1907 
Tot.al  Market.  $73  billion  (&1  billion ECUs) 
Others 
Sietwens 
lJn isys 
Phi I ips  Nixdorf 
Turnover growth of the top 10 Suppliers to Europe 
ranked by average growth% per year 1984-1987 
(Calculated from revenues converted to current ECUs) 
Nixdorf  21.6% 
Olivetti  20.3% 
Philips  19.3% 
Unisys  18.2% * 
Bull  15.5% * 
DEC  14.6% 
Siemens  13.1% 
HP  10.6% 
STC-ICL  8.2% * 
IBM  3.6% 
* significant merger or acquisition in the period 
Source: Datamation 
During the same period the European software industry has performed wdl 
with  average  yeariy  growth  r;~tt.•s  in  rcw·nue  (22%)  <lhovc  that  for  the 
UlflljlllltT systt'lllS 111:11 kl'l :1s  <I  whok ( J_')\;) 
As a  generalization,  the  software  industry's success  has been  much  more 
apparent  within  the  customised  systems  market  than  in  the  market  fnr 
packaged  software,  which  remains  overwhelmingly  US  dominated.  The 
software  industry seems therefore,  to he  in  a  strong competitive position 
within its  home markets.  It has yet to take up the challenge of trying  to 
penetrate the  US  market or to start to cn:-nrete  in  tht..~  pack.lged software 
market. .\I il:rode<:t  1 onics 
In  pcripher~ls,  Europe's  posiltun  remains  very  weak.  At  hest.  it  h:ts 
appreciable market share in  a few  niche market st:ctors.  This is  a matter of 
serious  n;ncern  since  peripherals  represent  28\(  ot  the  total  markd. 
lncrc;tsed funding of "technology push"  is  unlikely to cure this problem as 
long ;ts European companies have no ambition to exploit the results. 
In  microekctronics (MEL), Europe is behind as a user anJ even more so  :-~s 
a  supplier.  Europe represented  17%  of the $36  billion  world market  for 
microelectronics in  1987.  In world-wide semiconductor markets, the share 
supplied  hy  European companies declined  from  15%  in  1980  to  11%  hy 
ll)~l a figure  which has been maintained up to 1987. 
The disparity  between  the  figures  for  supply and demand  1s  a  cause  for 
concern <.~bout the European industry. 
Europe within the world market for microelectronics 
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The principal reason why  Europe represents such  a  small fraction  of the 
woriJ market is the relative absence of major users of microchips in  Europe, 
which  h<i:>  virtually no world scale data processing or computer peripherals 
manufacturers and where the leading consumer electronics companies have 
only a rather modest production in Europe. 
9 Industrial 
Automation 
Industry 
restructuring 
The Eun1pean  MEL market  is  satisfie~:  1fi  the  m.:in  hy  US  and  f.tliope:~n 
suppl icrs.  J apant.:se companies at  prc:-,ent  have  l1n!y  ;1  h "'' sh:u e  ( 17  ·:;;..) 
wht:reas they  have 50% of the world  ;.~s  a whok.  The rn;u·ket  share ot  the 
Far East suppliers will  unavoidably rise in  the short term particubrly when 
one observes that the sectors uf the market where Far East manufacturers 
are particularly strong are also those with the highest growth potential. 
Few surveys address the  industrial automation  market  specifically  and  in 
those that  do,  there is  overlap with other researchers' estimates of the IT 
market.  The world  market  for  industrial automation  in  1987  was  $3t1.6 
billion  (including  CAD/CAM,  numerical  control,  robots,  programmable 
controllers,  flexible  manufacturing  systems  and  computers  used  in 
manufacturing).  Europe represents 27% of these markets. 
In the market terms, Europe is ahead in inte&'Tated  automated systems and 
strong  in  machine  tools.  Japan,  particularly,  but  also  the  US,  lead  in 
elementary robots,  and numerically controlled tools, whilst most computa 
aided design systems come from the US. 
Significant  industrial  restructuring has occurred over the  past  five  years. 
Mergers,  acquisitions  and  rationalization  have  been  going  on  in  all  IT 
related industries most notably in telecommunication equipment supply but 
also  in  microelectronics and  software companies.  The  least  change  has 
occurred  in  the  computer  companies  where  one  can  still  identify  the 
national champions in  each of the larger member states.  In  addition,  IT 
companies are also collaborating in  a number of new ways in the promotion 
of international standards, in  software development and within EUREKA 
Industrial  restructuring  is  one  area  where  ESPRlT  may  have  had  a 
significant catalytic effect. 
10 Wor!.,pl:m 
formulation 
Opinions of the 
worhplan 
WORKPLAN FORMULATION AND FUNDING OF ESPRIT 
Industry was the main driving force in  defining first  the research areas and 
then  the  goals  and workplans  for  ESPRIT.  The  Round Tahle of twel\'e 
industrial  organisations  (AEG,  Bull,  CGE.  GEC.  ICL,  Nixdorf,  Olivetti. 
Philips,  Plessey, Siemens, STET, Thomson) referred to as the "Big  12"  was 
set up to advise the Commission in  this regard.  The hope was that through 
this  process,  research  and  development  relevant  to  real  market 
opportunities and exploitation possibilities would  be  attempted.  Initialiy. 
this did not happen.  Perhaps the main reason was the considerable current 
of scepticism  among senior management within  large organisations about 
the..:  chances of ESPRIT achieving anything worthwhile.  In any  event  the 
early workplans did  not  address the core business  needs of the principal 
protagonists and concentrated on activities where competitors could actually 
agrt·•:  to collaborate in  a "precompetitive" way.  Despite these problems at 
the  inception  of the  programme  the  rather  pragmatic work  plan  which 
resulted did address a number of technological issues of great significance in 
the  three  areas  of  microelectronics,  software  technology  and  advanced 
information  processing,  and  their  application  to  office  systems  anJ 
computer integrated manufacturing. 
After ESPRIT  was launched,  the  first  call  for  proposals was  made  with 
commendable speed early in 1984. 
The  ERB  heard  from  a  number  of  interviewees  that  the  "Big  12"  are 
unrepresentative of industry as a whole and therefore, unsuited to the task 
of formulating the programme.  The user voice was not represented either. 
Whilst this comment may have an element of truth in it,  the ERB believes 
th•:re  was  no  practical  or  effective  alternative  to  the  approach  adopted. 
Some augmentation with, for instance, the larger software companies mig.ht 
strengthen the process today. 
It ·.vas  unfortunate but  understandable that,  initially,  the large companit:s 
involved did not have any accord on the product priorities for the inJustry 
as a whole.  This situation compared poorly with the coherence of Japanese 
programmes as perceived in  Europe.  Today, following five years of working 
together  and  building  up  mutual  trust,  strategy  is  being  more  clearly 
:trticulateJ and, within ESPRIT If, pursued in a more focussed way. 
Participants'  criticisms  of  the  workplan  were  few  and  its  content  w:b 
considered  to  he  acceptable  hy  the  majority.  Answers  to  the  ERB's 
questionnaire indicated greater satisfaction with  the  ESPRIT II  workplan 
than with that of ESPRIT I. 
11 Funding  The allocation of funding to the vari.;t...s work areas was nlllre or less <:qu.div 
divided,  except  for  computer  i!<icgrated  manufacturing  which  n::c,~ivt:~i 
about one third less than the other areas. 
ESPRIT  funding  was  preuominantly  allocated  to  industry,  approrriatdy 
enough given the industrial nature of the programme. 
The "Big 12" received 50% of the total ESPRIT budget and were involved in 
70% of projects.  Their share of the programme has been falling with  time 
as more small and medium sized companies joined the programme and, of 
course, when Spain and Portugal joined the Community.  SMEs (enterprises 
with  under 500  employees)  participated  in  65% of projects and  received 
14% of the funding. 
ESPRIT I Funding allocated by sector 
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RESEARCH AREAS 
Microelectronics (MEL) is a key area.  Arguably it is the key strategic :1rea 
for IT research and development in  the future. 
Microelectronics is  being used  in  an ever-widening range of markets from 
aviation to automobiles, from toys to telephones, from weapons to washing 
machines.  The functionality of aU  this  electronic equipment is  becoming 
embedded with the chips to an  ever increasing extent.  Hence, one can see 
the  really  strategic  importance  of microelectronics  to  the  future  of  the 
European IT industry, and many other industries besides. 
The  belief  that  aU  the  industries  which  are  becoming  dependent  on 
embedded  microelectronics  can  develop  competitively  by  purchasing 
standard  components  from  remote  and  competing  nations  is  fallacious. 
Close  working  relationships  between  major  semiconductor  users  and 
suppliers are essential. 
The  research  programme  has  produced  some  noteworthy  achievements. 
Examples are: 
- In silicon technologies, many of the projects were of a "catch up" nature 
and have been successful in  so far  as the widening of the technological 
gap has been arrested. 
- In computer aided design, valuable results were produced. 
With  hindsight,  one  must  suggest  that  the  MEL  workplan  was  over 
ambitious for the funding available.  The resources were spread too thinly 
over too wide a  range of topics, including silicon  bipolar, gallium arsenidl: 
and CAD technologies. 
It is  worth observing that most of the exploitation potential over the  next 
decade  is  in  silicon  devices,  yet  much  of  the  work  was  done  in  other 
technologies.  It has  to  be  noted,  however  that  the  major  resources  in 
CMOS technology were committed in the binational Mega project. 
The weak position of Europe in  the high growth areas of the technology is 
well known, and should have provided clear guidance for the R&D priorities 
in  this area.  The Mega project and that proposed in JESSI have a stronger 
sense of strategic direction. 
13 Software 
Technology 
MEL technology. growth potential. Europe's position. 
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Software technology is  a  foundation  technology for  almosr aU  areas of IT 
and its application.  It is  also  an  area of relative  European strength  that 
deserves to be given emphasis. 
The stated goal of this research area was to do what was necessary to put 
the software  development  process  on  a  sound  engineering  footing.  Sub 
areas  were  defined  to  deal  with  formal  methods,  development  tools, 
management  aspects,  quality  measurement  and  the  development 
environment. 
Progress has been made in  formal  methods.  At the start of ESPRIT little 
use was  made of formal  description languages due to the inefficient code 
produced.  The present position is an improvement but still largely confined 
to the research environment.  Some of the software tools work can be rated 
successful and the portable common tools environment is  moving towards 
acceptance as an international standard.  The work  has been  valuable for 
inhouse developments but has yet to result in commercial exploitation. 
Technology push has achieved a certain amount in  this domain but the time 
when  every  commercial  programmer  uses  standard  techniques,  or every 
university  teaches  them,  is  still  far  distant.  The  chaUenge  now  is  to 
disseminate the results and see them applied. 
More inputs from  the major software system suppliers to the definition of 
what is required in this area would be valuable.  Many of them claim to have 
achieved,  and  be  routinely  practising.  the  creation  of  software  on  a 
predictable and reliable engineering basis. 
14 Advanced 
Information 
Processing 
Ollice Systems 
This  area  covered  knowledge  based  systems  (KBS),  new  computer 
architectures and speech and image processing. 
It  is  a widely held belief that most systems within the next  five  to ten years 
will  have  key  components  based  on  KBS,  which  is  therefore,  a  key 
technology which  may  have a  significant bearing on  Europe's competitive 
position in the 1990s. 
The work in  KBS  has moved during the life of ESPRIT I from almost pure 
research  towards  application,  reflecting  the  successful  transfer  of  KBS 
theory into the industrial environment.  With the benefit of hindsight, it  is 
probably true that there was some over emphasis on this topic in  ESPRIT I. 
There are  always  "fashions"  in  R&D  and,  early  in  ESPRIT I  this  topic 
became extremely fashionahle.  In  ESPRIT II a more realistic view -of  this 
subject has been adopted. 
New  computers  architectures  leads  potentially  to  exploitation  in  high 
performance microprocessor chips and in  supercomputers.  Both of these 
areas will  be of importance in  the 1990s.  European industry does not seem 
either well placed or determined to attack these two market areas. 
One  project  in  this  area  which  was  a  considerable  success  was  the 
Supernode project which  supported applications and,  to  some extent,  the 
development of the floating-point transputer. 
Technologies  related  to  the  processing  of images,  understanding natural 
language  and  processing speech will  be of major  importance  in  the  next 
decade.  Work in  this area has been principally of a research nature.  Some 
interesting demonstrations have been achieved.  However, few projects have 
reached the stage of moving towards marketable products, nor would  it  be 
realistic to  expect  this  at  this  stage.  This  area continues justifiably  into 
ESPRIT II with increased funding. 
When launched this work area was selected as a fast growing IT application 
area of major strategic importance for the efficiency of business throughout 
the Community.  It represented one of the best test beds for the outcome of 
the three technology research areas, microelectronics, software technoll1gy 
and advanced information processing. 
Viewed  five  years later  it  was  disappointing  for  two  reasons.  First,  the 
office  systems environment was  revolutionised  by  the  personal computer, 
the  lo..:al  area network  and some of the  most  reliable  and,  latterly,  user 
friendly software the market had ever seen.  Whilst some European vendors 
have had noteworthy successes in  the market place, the technological base 
for  office  systems  remains predominantly American.  The changes in  the 
marketplace occurred a  good deal  faster than the research projects could 
cope with. 
The second point was that the use of office systems projects as a test bed for 
results obtained in  micro electronics, software technology and AlP simply 
did not occur.  The difficult management task of trying to cross fertilize one 
area with results from another was not undertaken. 
Within the office systems area it  is difficult to involve users since, typically, 
they would not think of carrying out research.  This is quite different from, 
15 Computer 
Integrated 
\ bnufacturing 
for example, the manufacturing area where the larger users frequently have 
research personnel who can readily join ESPRIT projects. 
Nevertheless, the area was  not  without  achievements.  Two projec:s  h<J\ <:: 
advanced  the  technology of high  speed optical  fibrl':'  !oct! are3  net,'i':)r~:~ 
One project produced demonstrations of the use of optical disc technology 
for  storing  multimedia  data,  a  technology  which  has  go<.cd  expioit;.l.l;on 
potential for  the  1990s.  The  results of another are being  e:--:p!,~·iteJ  wi•h:  . 
automatic letter sorting systems.  Another has made prt)gress in  the J!!tic.:t 
field  of  handwriting  recognition  and  useful  work  has  been  done  in  th:: 
standardisation of office documents for interchange between machines. 
The ability  of Europe's  manufacturing sector  to continue  to compete  in 
international  markets  in  future  is  critically  important,  and  computer 
integrated manufaturing (CIM)  has an important role  to p!ay  in  ensuring 
this.  It  is  also a  very large potential market for  IT equipment.  For lx: .. h 
these  reasons,  CIM  is  an  area  that  should  be  viewed  as  of  stratc;ic 
importance. 
The  CIM  area  relates  to  the  total  range  of  computer  integiJtd 
manufacturing  activities  including:  computer  aided  design  (CAD;, 
computer aided engjneering (CAE), computer aided manufacturing (CAM). 
flexible  machining  and  assembly  systems,  robotics,  testing,  and  qu:.Jl!ty 
control.  The area was selected for its potential impact on the me\hoJs anc! 
economies  of production,  particularly  in  the  IT  industries,  and  also  for 
manufacturing industry in general.  Users and suppliers are both involv~d in 
CIM projects with  the  result  that  exploitation  potential  is  high  especi<..!l.J; 
where complex integrated systems are concerned, which is the market sector 
in which Europe excels. 
There have been a  number of successful projects in  the area including one 
in the standards area, involving a multivendor environment, where there are 
indications that Europe has achieved a position of technological leadcrsh ip. 
Participants in  the CIM area showed the highest level of satisfaction wht.•n 
responding  to  the  questionnaire  concerning  improvement  to  their 
organisations technological position. 
CIM is  the only work area which deals significantly with things mechanical. 
It  is,  therefore,  appropriate  to  point  out  that  a  number of interviewees 
regretted the absence within ESPRIT of "mechatronic" projects which bring 
together mechanical and electronic skills in  a  disciplined way.  Nor did the 
CIM workplan extend to the consideration of continuous flow proces.-;es. 
For the future, attention must he paid to user attitudes and understanding 
in Europe.  It is this, more than shortage of technology, which is holding up 
the wider adoption of computer integrated manufacturing. 
16 Opinions of 
l{cscarch Areas 
There were  several  IT  rcbtcJ areas  not  included  within  ESPRIT whi  .. :h 
were drawn  to  the ERB's attention during the review process.  This  is  no 
criticism.  Indeed, in  a focussed programme there should be more omissinns 
th<m  in  an unfocussed one. 
Some of the suggestions pointed towards the core businesses of the larger 
companies.  The relative scarcity of projects in  such areas and the reasons 
why this should be so have already been discussed. 
Some of the topics mentioned address areas of technology which should be 
considered,  but  not  necessarily  included,  in  the  formation  of  future 
workplans.  Others,  are  already  being  worked  upon  within  ESPRIT  II. 
Examples quoted by participants include silicon materials, advanced CMOS, 
crystal growth  equipment,  mechatronics, optoelectronics, neural networks, 
domain  languages  and  conceptual  schema,  portable  displays,  and  the 
ergonomics and efficiency of software tools. 
The questionnaire  responses showed  that a  larger number believed  that 
ESPRIT objectives had been met adequately or well in  the AlP and ClM 
areas than elsewhere. 
To  what  extent  haue  the  ESPRIT  1  objectives 
been ,et  in  the area or: 
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INFRASTRUCTURE  INFORMATION EXCHANGE SYSTEM 
The  Information  Exchange  System  (IES)  arc:~a  within  ESPRIT  haJ  two 
objectives: 
- the provision of communications services to  ESPRIT participants hoth 
industrial and academic. 
- the encouragement of the development and adoption of Open Systl?ms 
Interconnection (OSI) standards. 
The task of providing effective electronic mail services to ESPRIT users did 
not meet expectations.  EuroKom, which is the principal IES service, and is 
provided  hy  University  College  Dublin  Computer  Centre  was  initially 
chosen by  the Commission. It has been continuously improved during the 
lifetime of ESPRIT, yet  still  provides  only  a  limited  set  of the  services 
needed by the R&D community.  It is actuaUy used by relatively few  project 
consortia and DG XIII staff, although those who do use it,  find  it  valuable. 
Other  forms  of electronic  mail  are  also  little  used.  Facsimile  has  now 
become  the  most  prevalent  means  of  telecommunication  between 
participants. 
Participants assessment of communication methods 
Io what  extent have  you  used/found  of value 
the following  communication  methods  between  partners'? 
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tkvdopment projt:ch.  ·;  h·-·  <)hjt:L·t  <:f  !hi:~  '-t'!  pf rwjcct:-; was  to encourage 
and accelerate the av_a;!:ibility  llf Europ<::m  ( >Sl  pt oJUL'L·,  in  order that the 
information exch<lfl;c  irifr:~-:t1 u,_  -~urt: sen in::;, ,,.,;J ht'C<lrllt' OSI conformant. 
These projects have helped to  strengthen  E': rope..: 's  posit ion  with  regard to 
open systems.  The experience of ESPRIT f. !d  <~n  intluence on  the setting 
up  of SPAG services  and the  pt ojecb. thcn·,-:L·Ives.  have created groups of 
people skilled and experienced in open syste!ilS software.  They have not, as 
yet,  had an  appreciable  impact on  th::  ava il.,hility  ni OSI  products on  the 
market  thus  demonstratinf th;Jt  the  origin::!  objectives  set  in  1984  were 
overamhitious. 
A European value aJJeJ serviL";.:  ahle to me::(  the nee<.b  of the collaborative 
R&D community remain:;  b<1lh  Jesirable a:1J  unavailable.  The benefits to 
projects  in  terms  of  more  r;•piJ  dt.:\'::lopn  l'nt  ;,nJ  iowa cost  could  be 
considerable.  It is  notewo1 tLy  th~:l rhe  LIS  h.:;  l,u~r. well  equipped with such 
research  networks  (ARPA.,  .:t<:j  since  thl'  i 97lh  and  is  now  investing 
considerable sums in  im~m:ving them  in  ter::1s  of both speed, compatibility 
and  facilities,  where<.~s  Eur•:pe  has  nev~;  invested  in  such  services  to 
anything like the same exrcnl. 
It is  perhaps an anomaly tlt:lt  t~•·: provi:-.:on  .;i IES  r..:m;tins within ESPRIT, 
since  it  should  be,  and  is  tu  some  extent  meeting  the  needs  of  all 
collaborative R&D workers.  It might  th.:re:.'t'rt~ b.:  more appropriate for  a 
service  to  be  defined  and  rt..i1l  that  co•Jld  meet  the  nceJs  of the  whole 
Framework programme in futun.:. 
Activity  to  improve  the  networking infrast1 udure fur  research workers is 
being fostered  hy  lES  staff will;in  the Cnn,mission.  thn1ugh  COSINE (an 
OSI network primarily for academ1•;s) and hy  altt'mpting to exploit the OSI 
products and experience of majur European •endl1rs.  At the same time the 
general data communic:.ttious infr<tsiructurc  i:;  only now  being improved hy 
the PTI's. 
The take  up of users  or:  this  sort  nf nt:t-,.·crk  is  dearly key  to  its  success. 
Whilst the critical mass of user~ is  building up,  funding  will  be needed weU 
above the 50% level. 
In  this  regard  the  Cnr:':-nissHH~. whi:..:h  part:e;p:1~es in  all  projects, and the 
largest companies, parti...:ij1:tli;,:;  in  about two  <hirds  of all  projects, are in  a 
position to stimul<lte the usc r:!'  r.Ltworks coasiuerahly, \o,hich could mitigate 
this cost burden. 
European research  ne~wor~::-; ;wd  th;,;  in for  n;H ion  ~~xch:tnge services which 
could run  over them  arc irnp•_·., i:lflt  <i!H.i  u;-gcnt  topic-;.  There is  '-'  neeJ to 
reassess the whole 0f this area ar.d the Commission's precise rule within it. 
\9 Trans-European 
cooperation 
RESULTS OF ESPRIT 
The  most  striking  result  of  ESPRIT  is  that  it  has  influenced  several 
thousand scientists and engineers in  information technology fields to  think 
European and to do so in  a positive way.  One of the objectives of ESPRIT 
was to promote trans-European industrial cooperation and this it succeeded 
in  doing,  initially  by  imposing  the  collaborative  format  onto  project 
composition.  Now those who have experienced such collaboration see it  as 
an  effective  technique  for  many  kinds  of  projects  with  a  number  of 
beneficial side effects. 
The thinking behind this way  of working was partly that  it  would  achieve 
results faster (with a larger team), results more broadly based, and results  :~ t 
lower cost per participant due to the sharing of results.  All these have been 
realised although the extra cost of interworking has been considerable. 
The more strategic purpose in  making ESPRIT a collaborative programme 
was  the  realization  that  if  European  industry  was  to  compete  in  world 
markets it must abandon its fragmented nationalism. 
ESPRIT collaborations are  having  the  positive  effect  of creating a  large 
group of research workers  and  managers who  have  direct  experience  of 
what it  means to work with other companies in  other countries.  Over time. 
as  these  people  rise  in  seniority  they  will  be  influential  in  overcoming 
barriers of culture and mutual suspicion and will  be catalytic in creating a 
more cooperative business environment than exists today. 
As  wdl  as  industrial  cooperatio11,  ESPRIT  has  fostered  links  between 
universities and industry in a surprising efficient manner.  These are proving 
very valuable, particularly the newly formed international linkages. 
Participants' assessment of how successful cooperation has been 
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Cooperation worked well  according both  to  the  ERB's interview findings 
and  a  significant  majority  of  the  questionnaire  respondents.  The 
questionnaire results suggcs!t:d  less  successful co-operation with  the lar);t.' 
companies.  Certainly, organisations find it  easier to deal with enterprises of 
comparable size  to  t~eir. o'Nn,  and,  of course,  the  questionnaire  response 
contained  a  preponderance  from  smaller  enterprises.  Therefore,  this 
slightly negative finding is felt to be understandable. 
The second  important result of ESPRIT is  the  improvement which  it  has 
induced in  the technology base. 
Some of this improvement is in  much needed "catch up" technology.  Rather 
too much of the technological advance has been in  niche areas with limikd 
potential for market exploitation.  Given the manner in  which the workplan 
was constructed this is, perhaps, not surprising. 
The improvements in  the technology base were far from uniform amongst 
the recipients of ESPRIT funding.  The large companies perceive moderate 
improvements  to  their  technology  base  relative  to  their  international 
competitors.  The SMEs have a less international view and see the results of 
their projects as significant and relevant. Universities identified one reason 
for  ESPRITs  influence  on  their  technological  strength  as  simply  extra 
funding.  They also see ESPRIT focussing their work on areas of greater 
relevance. 
During interviews the ERB ohserved that the number of projects rated by 
participants as a  success was  exceptionally high  for  an  R&D programme, 
ESPRIT  was  also  praised  for  the  stability  it  introduced  by  virtue  of 
providing funding  up  to  five  years,  in  contrast  to  national and company 
funded projects. 
From  interviews  with  large  companies  and  national  administrations  it 
appears that there is  a growing shortage of skilled staff in  engineering and 
information  technology.  In  some  Member States  enrolment  in  relevant 
university degree courses is  falling and university funding is  being reduced. 
Meanv.hile,  demand  for  trained  people,  especially  software  engineers,  is 
likely to increase, particularly in  industries applying IT. 
There does not seem to have  been a  significant  reso1·.rce  problem during 
ESPRIT so far, but the ERB is  concerned for the future, especially in  the 
light of demographic trends.  ESPRIT has been successful in stemming this 
decline  to  some  extent  both  by  maintaining  awareness  of the  strategic 
importance of IT to Europe and by channelling much needed funding for IT 
R&D into universities, thereby allowing more staff to be employed. 
21 Exploitation  The questionnaire invited  participants to  assess  the  nature of the  benefits 
which  their  ESPRIT  projects  had  produced.  Their  replies  are  to  be 
considered  bearing  in  mind  that  many  ESPRIT  I  projects  are  not  yet 
finished. 
Participants assessment of exploitation benefits of their projects 
Wh"t  is  the  n,,ture  of  the  econo, ic  benefit 
to  your  organisation fro, this  project? 
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The most frequent response ( 69%) was increased knowledge, followed by  a 
belief that research goals more ambitious than would otherwise have been 
set had been reached.  Other responses (improved development techniques 
and  lower  cost/faster  results)  all  suggested  a  rather  high  proportion  of 
projects finding  their benefit  within  the department where  the work  had 
been  done.  Changes  in  software  methods and  use  of tools  were  cited, 
during interviews, as contributing to improved development techniques. 
There was  also  a  significant  number  of responses  claiming contribution 
either  to  existing  products  (35%)  or  new  products  (  45%  ).  These  are 
encouragingly high figures.  The high percentage of new products should be 
qualified by observing that many projects are producing "demonstrators" or 
preprototypes  which  the  project  team  hope  will  lead  to  fuUy  fledged 
products but which, in practise, may not. 
An appreciable minority (29 %) reported, a contribution to standards. 
That  15%  could  see  no  direct  benefit,  is  not  wholly  unexpected  for  an 
ambitious  R&D  programme  but  should  perhaps  be  coupled  with  the 
thought that the Commission is not strong minded enough in stopping work 
of low value, nor, perhaps, are the participants who gave this response. International 
standards 
ThL:  inlt:rchange  and collahor:,tion  within  proje  .... ·ts  was  fu~ the  mo:,l  p:!r[. 
gooJ and  knowledge was  transf~.:rred well  both hetwt.:en  industrial p;1rtners 
and  between  industry  and  <1cademic  partners.  Difficulties  sometimes 
occurred  between  large  and  small  industrial  partners.  who  sought  m()re 
information  than  the  l~rger  partner  was  willing  to  divulge,  but  the:;e 
instances were not numerous  .. 
Between projects, knowledge transfer was poor, results from other projects 
proving  singularly  inaccessible.  Knowledge  transfer  outside  ESPRIT 
participants was also low. 
The Commission  has arranged a number of sector specific workshops which 
have gone some way towards addressing the difficulties. 
The annual ESPRIT Conference week has proved an important forum  for 
demonstrating what has been achieved and for establishing contacts through 
whom knowledge transfers can take place later  It has been less successful in 
effecting  immediate  knowledge  transfer  and  in  providing  international 
recognition of its proceedings. 
It  would  be  highly  desirable  if  the  Commission  could  improve  on  the 
knowledge transfer between projects, e.g.  by  the promotion of a data bank 
with  valuable information on  the  projects.  The data  bank could possibly 
also be accessible to other European companies. 
A number of ESPRIT projects ( 15  %) aimed to work on standards.  The IT 
marketplace is  moving more and more towards the adoption of standards, 
out of necessity, given the complexity of the many levels at which dissimilar 
computer systems are required to communicate.  Only companies with the 
largest  market shares can  afford  to promote their proprietary standards. 
The rest need to  use common  international standards, where competitive 
advantage  should  lie  with  those  who  lead  in  standards  development. 
ESPRIT has helped European companies to move from followers to leaders 
in  the evolution of standards across a range of technologies including: 
- Manufacturing automation. 
- CAD. 
- Operating systems. 
- Document architecture. 
- Software tools 
- Communications (051). 
- Data compression. 
The ratification of international standards is  always a  lengthy process and 
few  of those worked  upon within  ESPRIT have yet gone through all  the 
stages.  The fuU  impact of this useful work will  therefore not be felt  for a 
number of years. 
23 Overall impression 
favourable 
MODALITIES AND MANAGEMENT 
The procedures and managerial techniques which have been used and 
refined during the five years of ESPRIT include the following features. 
- Cali for proposals against a published workplan. 
- Evaluation by independent experts without their knowing who proposers 
are. 
- Harmonization of the evaluators  recommendations by  the Commission 
and  the  ESPRIT  Management  Committee,  which  comprises 
representatives of each Member State. 
- Contract  negotiation  with  selected  proposers  including  agreement  of 
technical content, budget, labour rates and milestones. 
- Project supervision by a Commission project officer. 
- Periodic review by independent experts. 
- Regular  progress  payments  and  retention  of  some  money  until  the 
Commission accepts a project as complete. 
The ERB find these procedures to be sound and the overall management of 
the  programme to have been satisfactory. 
As  part  of the  questionnaire,  participants  were  asked  to  assess  various 
aspects of the management of the programme.  Some of the more notable 
results are summarised in the following table. 
Participant's  assessment  of  various  aspects  of  the  Commission's 
management of the programme 
How  do  you  rate the Commission's operation 
of  the following  aspects of  ESPRIT  I 
Proj cct  Reviews 
~--~~~~~~~~~~ 
Uorkplan 
Defiuition 
2B 
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The procedure for calling for proposals was felt to be satisfactory.  However. 
the format  in  which  proposals should  he submitted could be more tightly 
defined to reduce both  the cost  and the workload of preparing proposals. 
One problem with proposals  is  that the Commission receives such a  larl!e 
number that it isinevitable that many will be rejected or have their budgets 
drastically reduced.  The practise· has  therefore sprung up of participants 
submitting over inflated cost estimates within proposals.  Budget guidelines 
should be included, when calling for proposals and consideration should he 
given to rejecting proposals which do not get dose to the guidelines. 
In  the main, participants had few difficulties finding partners.  Those who 
had  used  the  infrastructure  provided  by  the  Commission  to  identify 
potential partners were critical of its effectiveness. 
The evaluation phase was consiJered good, but was not without its critics. 
Clearly a  careful balance has to he struck between the technical advice of 
the  evaluators  and  other  considerations  thereafter.  The  evaluators  are 
experts in  the field  of the proposal and, although there should, ideally.  be 
more industrialists amongst  their number,  their judgements are respected 
and considered fair.  The scoring system is such that very few proposals are 
shortlisted and proceed to  contract without alteration by  the Commission 
and the EMC. 
The time taken for  the technical evaluation and subsequent financial  and 
contractual negotiations take typically five to nine months with some cases 
taking even  longer.  This should  not  be  shrugged off as the bureaucratic 
norm  in  todays  rapidly  changing  technological  environment.  Better 
feedback  to  proposers  on  the  progress  of their  applications  during  this 
phase is desirable. 
During the phase between proposal and contract start, some consortia have 
been pressured on a number of occasions into accepting either an additional 
partner or even whole consortia.  Participants whose project team had been 
merged  with  another  consortium  strongly  condemned  such  "shotgun 
marriages", which lessen the chance of success. 
One of the Commission's responses to the heavy oversubscription which  is 
occurring with each call for proposals is,  in  some instances, to impose large 
budget cuts on the selected proposals in  order to have a  reasonably high 
success rate.  The effect of this  is  to cause consortia to reduce the work 
content, sometimes abandoning partners, particularly SMEs and universities 
from  the consortia  in  the process.  The  revised  technical  content of the 
project  may  finally  hear  little  rdationshir with  the  original.  When  this· 
occurs it would be advisable to confirm with the original evaluators that the 
project is still ofworthwhik 4uality. 
25 Unilied contract 
Project officers 
Review process a 
success 
The recently introJuced unified contract was the source cf srmv.:  dis.:ontent. 
This would probably he true of any long and complex contr;,ct  Jocument. 
but there are areas of considerable complexity and  difficulty.  nc  claust:~ 
defining intellectual property rights were felt  to be difficult  to  apply  It'  ~til 
situations.  Questions of whether a partner joining late in  a project sfH.ui·J 
have  all  the  earlier  results  or  whether  a  foreign  company  acquiring  an 
ESPRIT participant should gain aU  the knowkdge or whether ::  very  ~rr.::ll 
contributor to a  project should gain  aU  the  results emaiiati!lg from  a  >"t.':-'< 
large contributor were all raised as problems. 
At this stage, however, the ERB feels that it  would be  count~rproductive (~ 
introduce numerous changes to  it  until more experience has been gaind in 
its use. 
The project,  once  under  way,  is  under the  supervtston  of a  Commis· i ··:-1 
project officer.  Project  officers are perceived as heing technically  :lw,!:.-~. 
overworked <1nd  supportive of the projects under their control.  One w::Jy  .-)j 
reducing their workload would be to abandon the monthly project repo~:i:;; 
which is  perceived to  serve little  useful purpose.  Project officers se•:m  tr: 
have little  influence on  the pace of either finalisation  of contncts or  the 
speed  of  payments  both  of  which  have  been  sources  of  consiJer::.t•1e 
criticism.  This is particularly true of final payments.  Project offi(:ers sb·.)tci.J 
provide a continuous point of contact with the Commission throughou: :h,.: 
project.  Clearly  it  is  most  desirable  that  staff turnover  amongst  projc':! 
officers be kept to a  minimum.  More resources should be devcted  to  this 
area. 
Projects are typically reviewed every six  months.  This precess is  d~:emcrj " 
particularly valuable feature. 
ESPRIT was the first amongst publicly funded programmes to introduce t'1 !:, 
review procedure.  Reviewers are seen as competent and helpful to both the 
project and the Commission, especiaUy when work has to be redirecteJ or 
even stopped.  They also make valuable technical contributions tc the work 
although sometimes their reports are slow to feed back to the consortia. 
Project objectives naturaUy  change with  time  and should be  reviewed,  at 
least  annually.  Minor changes  in  project  direction  are  usually  agreeJ  to 
speedily but when major changes are needed, due to wh:ttever reason (  cwc.:r· 
ambitious goals, withdrawal of one partner, or change of partners' business 
strategy)  the  contractual documentation  has  to  be  altered  and  delays  of 
unsatisfactory length have often ensued. 
It  is  apparent  that  when  a  project  is  running  very  unsatisfactorily,  the 
Commission is  not well  equipped to deal with the problem.  There appears 
to he a reluctance to exert authority in such. situations. 
26 Terminating 
projects 
prematurely 
lnadequatc access 
to results 
\lain contractors 
role 
It will  not be worthwhile to complete all projects.  The small minority which 
may need to be stopped will  usually be  identified at a  review. They should 
he dealt with as a  matter of urgency.  The sort of actions required are that 
senior management at the Commission should contact the prime contractor 
at director level and the project team should be given a relatively short time 
to rectify the problem.  Another review should be scheduled perhaps three 
months later so that in  the  last  resort, the prnject can be  stopped without 
undue cost or delay. 
It is  no criticism of a programme such as ESPRIT if some projects have to 
he stopped.  Rather it  is  an  unhealthy sign when little pruning has  taken 
place.  During  ESPRIT  I  less  than  10%  of  projects  were  terminated 
prematurely. 
One  aspect  of  management  which  received  cnttctsm  was  the  lack  of 
provision  by  the  Commission  of access  to  the  results  of other  ESPRIT 
projects.  The first cause of this weakness would seem to be  that although 
every  project  has  numerous  paper  deliverables  few,  if any,  of these  are 
agreed to give a technically informative description of the project in a form 
which  contains  no  confidential  information  preventing wider  circulation. 
Many  participants  requested  more  smalJ  technical  workshops  as  a 
mechanism  for  disseminating  results.  In  several  research  areas  the 
Commission  already  organise  workshops,  yet  there  is  a  demand  for  an 
increased number of these. 
A  second contributory factor  is  the lack of commitment to  the use  of IT 
within the Commission.  A database accessible to ail participants providing 
the facility  to  retrieve synopses of project results was  felt  by  many to  he 
needed. 
This  failure  to  use  computer  tec}miques  is  not  confined  to  informatit'll 
retrieval.  Project reporting and management and even  speed of p:~yment 
could  be  improved with  the  establishment  of consistent  computer  ba~cJ 
systems. 
The ESPRIT Review Board itself, in carrying out its enquiries, has suffered 
from the lack of an updated and appropriate project database for ESPRIT I. 
That for ESPRIT II  is a great deal better. 
Turning from the Commission's management of the programme, one must 
not forget the crucial project management role of the main contractor.  This 
is  a  difficult  task  particularly when the  le:.~der has  no  executive authority 
over memhers of the team.  High quality people are needed.  They are a 
scarce resource which  companies find  it  unrewardingly costly to assign  to 
the task.  The  larger companies  are  reducing  the  number of projects  in 
which they are prime contractors, which is unsatisfactory.  One suggestion to 
simplify  the  project  managers  task  is  to  introduce  simple  common 
procedures for  managing projects throughout the programme.  Another is 
for the Commission to arrange project management courses at the start of 
the projects.  The possibility of funding the project management task on a 
100 % basis should be considered. 
27 Consortia should be 
smaller 
The greater the number of partners the harder a project is  to  m:..~nage.  It  is 
felt  that for effective cooperation it  is  highly  desirable for  the project team 
to  visit  each  participants premises once  each  year.  At  the  rate  of one 
meeting every six  to eight weeks and allowing for  holiday periods this sets 
an effective ceiling on the number of participants.  It is also clear that, above 
a  certain  number of partners,  it  becomes  extremely  difficult  to  identify 
distinct complementary roles for each partner and the management of the 
project  becomes  inefficient.  Very  strong  opinions  were  expressed  th:-tt 
projects become unwieldy and inefficient when the number of partners rises 
above six. 
ESPRIT I  had  a  significant  proportion above  this  size  (some, of course, 
justified  for  their  standard  setting work).  The  proportion  has  risen  in 
ESPRIT II considerably which gives cause for concern.  The undesirability 
of large consortia, except  in  special cases was spelt out in  the Mid-Term 
Review.  The ERB can only stress again that consortia must not be allowed 
to become too large. 
Participants per project in ESPRIT I and ESPRIT II 
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RELATIONSHIP OF ESPRIT TO OTHER PRQGR·\MJ\tES 
ESPRIT J was a  much larger programme than any others managed hy  tht: 
Commission  in  related fie!Js.  l t  was  also  the first  to  introduce  th~ ('O· 
operative mode of operation, which was adopted in virtually aU subse4uent 
programmes.  With an expe<.:ted  ten year life and quite weU-defineJ areas of 
research it  provided a  stable and  continuous frame of reference in  which 
other programmes could emerge. 
Community funding through LSPRIT was welcomed in  all countries.  Most 
administrations endeavour to  perceive their national programme together 
with  Community  funded  programmes  as  parts  of a  strategically  unified 
whole.  How  they  do  this  varies  considerably  between  countries.  The 
smaUer ones have tendeJ to  t..:ncourage  suppliers  in  their participation  in 
ESPRIT.  In larger countries this is less evident.  ln France, national funding 
has  tended  to  shift  towards  other  scientific  fields  and  the  EUREKA 
programme which  is  pursued  with  vigour.  In  the  UK,  as  support  for 
ESPRIT has  risen,  so  the  budget  for  the  national  programme has  been 
reduced.  Small. highly innovative projects and those of a long term research 
nature are now  the  targets for  UK national funding.  A  similar targeted 
approach is adopted in Italy and Germany whereas the Netherlands tends to 
favour  more  market  oriented  developments.  Spain  has  increased  both 
national support for R&D and its participation in ESPRIT. 
Experience in  aU  Member States has established that there is  a place both 
for collaborative European programmes and for  programmes within  each 
country.  Some diversity and  plurality  in  sources of funding  for  research 
should be maintained. 
During  the  past  five  years,  an  increasing  emphasis  has been  placeJ on 
programmes which lead to exploitation in  a  fairly dear way.  Application-
oriented  programmes  have  been  introduced  such  as  RACE  (targt!ting 
broad-band communications throughout Europe). AIM (targeting the use of 
IT in  health care),  DELTA  (IT in  education) and  DRIVE (IT for  road 
transport).  One might observe that the ClM area within ESPRIT has many 
of the characteristic<; of these programmes. 
The  international  cooperation  proven  by  ESPRIT  was  foUowed  by 
EUREKA (funded from national sources).  Although there is  in  no direct 
connection between the two programmes (with the exception of COSINE. 
and possibly JESSI in  future), contacts are close as a result of the personnel 
put at the disposal of EUREKA by DG  Xlll. 
Coordination hdwcen Commission programmes is informal.  Awarcnl'ss of 
what  is  O<Xurring  in  other  programmes  t:ould  he  improved.  However, 
competition and duplication of effort between programmes does not seem 
to be a  matter of concern  to those  interviewed by  the  ERB.  Awareness 
outside the DG XIII of what is  going on within ESPRIT could be raised by 
having  more contact with  senior  technical  managers,  by  organising  user 
clubs and by increased international public relations. 
29 USA and Japan 
Funding and  timescales  of  European sh:ned  cost  ~:·c ·rarnme-;  ln  the  lT 
field. 
l  Programme  Start  Duration  Total Cost  I 
years  B ECUs  I 
ESPRIT I  1984  5  1.5 
ESPRIT II  1988  5  3.2 
RACE  1987  5  1.1 
DELTA  1988  2  0.04 
DRIVE  1988  3  0.12 
AIM  1988  2  0.04 
ESPRIT is a ten year programme worth 4.7 billion ECUs (50% Commission 
funded).  It  is  guided  and  steered  through  the  consensus  decisions  of 
experienced and influential industrial managers from all member states. 
The position in the US is  rather different.  The bulk of all  industrial R&D 
support  is  channelled  through  the  Department  of  Defence's  DARPA 
programmes, whilst the National Science Foundation funds more academic 
research.  DARPA runs at the level of approximately 1.3  billion ECUs per 
year (mostly  100  %  funded).  Each programme is  controlled  by  a  sin;k 
programme director, who establishes one vision of how to extend techno!csy 
in a given area. 
In Japan yet other models pertain, starting with  a strong consensus between 
the government and the national industries.  The creation of common R&D 
teams between partners of similar size and competence is a specific feature 
of  MITI's  sponsored  projects.  The  academic  world  and  SMEs  are 
effectively absent from those projects. 
30 Strategic 
impo1·tance of IT 
In  reviewing  ESPRIT,  essentially  at  the  half  way  point  of  a  ten  year 
programme.  it  is  pertinent  to  consider  what,  if  anything,  should  come 
beyond ESPRIT 
Information  technology  was  perceived  to  be  of strategic  importance  for 
Europe five years ago.  If anything, it will  be of even greater importance in 
five  years  time.  especially  in  the  microelectronics  field  where  the  ever 
increasing  functionality  becoming  embedded  in  each  chip  and  the 
pervasiveness  of  chip  technology  as  a  key  component  in  so  many 
commercial and domestic products and services is of great significance. 
It  has been said  that the  reason for  the kad of the  US  and Japanese  IT 
industries  is  that  where  these  industries  see  opportunities,  European 
industry and its customers see primarily risks.  Both European industry and 
its customers must be  mort: daring.  Technology is  changing so fast  that if 
one does not start to  invest  in  a  new product until  aU  problems have hecn 
solved, it will be obsolete before;:  it  reaches the market. 
Due  to  the  reducing  development  cycles  it  may  be  necessary  to  carry 
through IT R&D projects  ir.  a  shorter time span  (and with  more intense 
efforts) than currently.  Futun;: Commission-funded programmes might  try 
to encourage industry to do things faster.  The technology base of Europe 
does not in  general seem to be inferior to that of the US and Japan.  It is 
above all,  the ability and willingness of the European  IT industry to hring 
products into the market rapidly that is lacking. 
A  major  success  of  the  ESPRIT  programme  has  been  the  substanti.d 
increase in  trans-European cooperation.  1l1is  increase was  made possihk 
through  the  financial  contribution  of  the  Commission.  If  Community 
activity in  the IT field was substantially reduced after ESPRIT II.  the goL'd 
climate of cooperation that now exists might not he strong enough to persist. 
This would  be  most  unfortunate since  European  IT industry needs more, 
not less cooperation.  This is  true not only in  the fidd of R&D, but also in 
production  and  marketing.  European  IT  industries  should  wherever 
appropriate, join forces and C<impete with the world leaders. 
The  current  emphasis  on  cooperation  amongst,  and  sharing  of  results 
between,  European companies is  not made in  order to  create a  "fortress 
Europe".  Cooperations sh~Juld eventually l>e  possible with organisations in 
any country, hut tht;se coor,crations would need to he considered on a c:tsl· 
hy case basis and in an environment of total reciprocity. 
31 ( ;oal-oricr.tcd 
programmes 
Sy.pport MUSt 
cttntiRue 
ESPRIT has  useJ  the  hdt:,Jm-up  ~mp:  ,_1;1c';  ill  Jcfining lb Wt)rkpL.n.  "'1th 
many projects spread over most of lhe lT field.  A  J;tferent a1:proacr• ·.vhich 
might he con~idered for any future initiative 1s  to adopt programmes with<.. 
very few simply stated and chall<.. nging objectives. 
To concentrate European efforts on a  few  major ambitious goals this would 
require  a  fll{)re  ~tructured  cooperation  of  the  partners  and  a  iuller 
integrati<m of the work..  The JESSI  pro~ramme. which  intends to link  all 
sta~es i4l  the proOOctton chain, may be considered as an example of 5uch a 
programme in the fwtld o( microelectronics. 
Beya.td  ESf'RIT,  Ute  EJilB  therekxe believes community action  targetiAg 
the  IT  industry  muct  be continued.  There  ~ufficient  financial  re:K1tlrces 
shoukJ  be  provided  to  carry  out  both  a  broadly  based  te{.·hnology-push 
programme,  m:.~intainU.& the fruitful transnational collaborations and for  a 
few  amb-itious,  Mructured  goal-oriented  projects  to  maintain  a  ~trategic 
focus on the core activities of the IT industry. 
As well as the industrial aspects of what might follow ESPRIT it is necessary 
to consider basic research.  Support  must continue and even increase for 
basic research which underpins the long-term future.  While being tailored 
to the specific needs of the academic world. the  h:~sic research programme 
should allow eventually for an efficient knowledge exchange with industry. 
It  is  also  important  to  identify  programme  modalities  and  mechanisms 
which can react to the extremely rapid changes which are occuring within 
the IT industry.  Both technology and market conditions are developing with 
great rapidity. The pressure must be sustained to reduce timescales for all 
aspects of research and development within IT. 
32 Strategic 
Tactical applicable 
tu ESPRIT ll 
SUMMARY OF I,RINCll,AL RECOMMENI)ATION~ 
l.  As a whole IT remains an  <~rea of great strategic importance not onl: 
for  its  size  as  an  economic sector  but  also  for  future  employment. 
prosperity prospects and tjuality of life within the Community.  Within 
IT,  microelectronics  is  of  critical  importance.  Continued  sup{h 1rt 
should be  maintained,  particularly  in  microelectronics and compu!t.'r 
integrated manufacturing. 
2.  Cooperative S0/50 funded, transnational  R&D projects has proven to 
be an excellent way of helping Europe's IT industry. 
3.  Workplans for R&D progr<Jmmes must be driven by both suppliers and 
users, in order for them to be as relevant as possible to real market 
conditions.  The emphasis on  application  of IT within  ESPRIT II  is 
commendable.  However. the strategic focus should be even sharper 
4.  Basic research remains of fundamental importance to the evolution of 
the  IT  industry.  In  evolving  work  areas  which  distinguish  lx1sic 
research from  more targeted topics, care must he taken to maintain 
strong transnational links between universities and industry. 
5.  There is  a  clear place for continuing hoth  national and collaborati\·e 
European R&D programmes. 
6.  Awart:ness  of  and  coorJin:.ttion  with  other  European  programm<:s 
should be improved. 
7.  All  R&D  activity  1n  IT  must  be  able  to  react  rapidly  to  changing 
circumstances. 
I.  The larger software companies should join the primary workpbnning 
process. 
2.  Senior  management  of  large  companies  both  suppliers  and  users 
should rcvi(.'w the strategic relevance of the workplan. 
3.  Research  and  development  work  leading  towards  emerging 
.standards should he emphasised. 
33 4.  Greater  attention  should  he  given  tl~  influencing  user  :tttitude~  tll 
manufacturing automation  which  is  hoiJing up  the wid..:r  ;tlbption nr 
CIM concepts and technology, particularly amongst SMEs. 
5.  Information  Exchange  Systems should  he  reappraised,  including  the 
role of the Commission in  the provision and management of European 
services. 
6.  Improvements  which  reduce  the  time  from  workplan  defintiPn  r,., 
achieving results must be sought continuously. 
7.  The Commission  should  take additional  steps  to  improve access  hv 
participants to all  valuahle results of other projects respecting,  ""her~ 
necessary, participants proprietary rights.  Greater attention should he 
given to disseminating the results of ESPRIT projects and seeing th~·m 
applied.  This is particularly true of software technology. 
8.  The overaU  management  of projects  has  a  major  influence  on  their 
success.  The project objectives, the number of partners and the role uf 
each, the resources devoted to project management in the Commi.ssi,111 
and amongst  the participants as well  as  the  management  discipiint.:'s 
and procedures are all  factors contributing to  success or failure.  :\ 
careful review of project management aspects, in  the light of nunH::n>us 
detailed  recommendations contained  in  the  txtend·~d version  of the 
report of the ERB, is needed. 
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